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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES
AND THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
OF OPEN VERSUS SEALED BIDS
Sherry L. Jarrell
J. Neal Robbins**
Gary L. Shoesmith***
Brendan A. Fox****
INTRODUCTION
This paper takes as given that the goal of economic development
incentives (EDIs) is to improve the economic welfare of the citizens of
a particular geographic area. This paper does not attempt to answer the
question of whether EDIs, in their many forms, have in fact succeeded
in improving economic welfare, either in absolute terms or above
where economic welfare would have been in the absence of the EDI.
This paper takes the current state of EDI policy and implementation as
given, and focuses the analysis instead on the economic and legal
issues associated with open versus sealed bids. This paper reviews the
different approaches taken by various jurisdictions regarding the
openness of the bidding process and explores the sometimes
counterintuitive impact of making the bidding process more open and
transparent on the creation of economic wealth. The specific
experiences of the Boeing, Dell, Google and Caterpillar EDIs are used
to illustrate the analysis.
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I. OVERVIEW OF STATE JOB CREATION TAX INCENTIVES
State and local leaders across the country have continued to face
strong pressure from constituents and pundits to create jobs during the
prolonged job decline, which has affected a broad array of industries.
Many states are faced with the loss of traditional manufacturing jobs.
Facing these losses, states have turned to economic development
incentives to spur job growth.
North Carolina and South Carolina have emerged as national
competitors to bring new companies to their respective states using a
mix of state and local EDIs.1 North Carolina has long battled the loss
of its traditional manufacturing jobs in the textile and furniture
industries. Recently, state leaders in North Carolina have focused
much of the state's large EDI packages towards technology
companies—seen as a shift away from manufacturing. South Carolina,
while also targeting technology companies, has landed several highprofile manufacturers with EDIs, including BMW Manufacturing
Company2 and The Boeing Company. 3 North Carolina has shown a
willingness to compete for large manufacturers with their neighbor to
the south. In 2010, both North Carolina and South Carolina submitted
bids to heavy manufacturer Caterpillar, Inc., which ultimately chose
Forsyth County, North Carolina over a site in South Carolina. 4
Both states combine county or municipal incentives with statelevel incentives to create bids that often climb into the hundreds of
millions of dollars.5 Local incentives take many forms, including tax

1
See generally Sherry L. Jarrell, Gary Shoesmith & J. Neal Robbins, Law
and Economics of Regulating Local Economic Development Incentives, 41
Wake Forest L. Rev. 805 (2006).
2
Jack Lyne, New South Carolina Incentives Spur BMW's $400M, 400-Job
Expansion,
SITE
SELECTION,
Sept.
28,
2009,
http://www.siteselection.com/ssinsider/incentive/ti0210.htm.
3
David Slade & Katy Stech, Boeing's Whopping Incentives, POST &
COURIER,
Jan.
17,
2010,
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2010/jan/17/boeings-whoppingincentives/.
4
Richard Craver, Caterpillar to Expand Its Operations in Sanford,
WINSTON-SALEM
J.,
Aug.
6,
2010,
http://www2.journalnow.com/business/2010/aug/06/caterpillar-to-expand-itsoperations-in-sanford-ar-393666/.
5
Slade & Stech, supra note 3.
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rate reductions, refunds, grants, and property improvements.6 State
EDIs in North Carolina and South Carolina arise from similar statutory
mandates and delegated authorities. In North Carolina and South
Carolina, like many other states, the state-level EDIs can be grouped
into two predominant categories: job-based EDI and infrastructure EDI.
Both North Carolina and South Carolina governments operate in
a traditional, three-prong system consisting of a supreme court,
governor, and bi-cameral legislature.7 Both states have adopted
freedom of information legislation (FOIA).8 The question presented
here is whether the general notion that "transparency in government is
good" is truly beneficial in an EDI bidding process. The first step is to
examine the available incentives in each state and the information that
is made public during the bidding process.
A. NORTH CAROLINA
North Carolina has two primary EDI programs. The first, "Tax
Credits for Growing Businesses" (TCGB), contains incentives for job
creation and for property investment. 9 The N.C. General Assembly
created this program in 2006.10 The purpose of this legislation was to
replace the William S. Lee Quality Jobs and Business Expansion Act
with more narrowly-tailored credits that would create jobs and increase

6

See, e.g., Irwin Speizer, The China Trade: The State Lands the
Headquarters of a Company from a Country Many Tar Heel Manufacturers
Love to Hate , BUS. N.C., May 2006, at 36 (discussing North Carolina’s use of
direct grants, state tax credits, training assistance, and direct incentives from
county governments to lure Lenovo to the Research Triangle area).
7
For North Carolina, the structure of the state government is described in
the N.C. Constitution, NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONSTITUTION, N.C. GEN.
ASSEMB.,
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/legislation/constitution/ncconstitution.html
(last
visited June 28, 2011). For South Carolina’s structure of state government, see
the S.C. Constitution, SOUTH CAROLINA CONSTITUTION, S.C. LEG. ONLINE,
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/scconstitution/scconst.htm (last visited June 28,
2011).
8
Public Records Law, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132 (2010); Freedom of
Information Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-10 (2010).
9
Tax Credits for Growing Businesses, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.80
(2010).
10
The governor signed this bill into law on August 17, 2006. H. B. 2170,
2005-2006 Sess. (N.C. 2006).
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business investment in the state.11 Before the TCGB program, the
William S. Lee Act regulated a tiered incentive system in North
Carolina, which favored rural areas over more developed counties.
From a jobs perspective, a tier-1 county (wealthiest type of county)
would receive $500 in incentives per job created, while a tier-5 county
(poorest type of county) would receive $12,500 in incentives for the
same job.12
The second program is the One North Carolina Fund ("One
NC"), formerly the Governor's Industrial Recruitment Competitiveness
Fund.13 The One NC program promotes the installation and purchase
of equipment, structural repairs, and construction of new
improvements.14
B. SOUTH CAROLINA
Like North Carolina, South Carolina has job-creation and
infrastructure incentives.
There are three jobs incentives: the
traditional annual job tax credit and exemptions, 15 the annual small
business job tax credit,16 and the accelerated small business job tax
credit.17
South Carolina also promotes infrastructure and physical plant
investment with targeted credits.18 The state uses a fairly complex
system of fees-in-lieu of property taxes; it also provides credits in the
form of sales tax exemptions, grants, and loans for land acquisition.
South Carolina has also offered credits for worker training and
relocation, water and sewer infrastructure, site preparation, and road or
rail improvement.
11

Id.
WILLIAM SCHWEKE & FRANK DISILVESTRO, CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV.,
BUSINESS INCENTIVES AND NORTH CAROLINA'S TIER 1 COUNTIES: HAVE THEY
WORKED?
(Dec.
2008),
http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/BusinessIncentives_Tier1Counties[1].pdf.
13
One North Carolina Fund, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-437.70 (2010).
14
ONE NORTH CAROLINA FUND, N.C. DEP’T COMMERCE,
http://www.nccommerce.com/en/BusinessServices/LocateYourBusiness/WhyN
C/Incentives/OneNorthCarolinaFund/ (last visited June 28, 2011).
15
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3360(C)(1) (2010).
16
§ 12-6-3360(C)(2).
17
§ 12-6-3362.
18
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14-60 (2010) (This investment tax credit
is calculated as a percentage of the total aggregate basis for the particular
property.).
12
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C. SEALED VERSUS OPEN BIDDING
Both North Carolina and South Carolina have adopted specific
exemptions from their respective freedom of information and public
records legislation. In North Carolina, no disclosure is required under a
public records request until an EDI is awarded or rejected. 19 To the
contrary, in South Carolina, "confidential proprietary information
provided to a public body for economic development or contract
negotiations purposes is not required to be disclosed" under FOIA even
after an EDI has been awarded or rejected.20 Such a distinction means
that North Carolina is considered more “open” in its bidding process
than South Carolina.21 It is also important to note that cost-benefit data
relating to EDI packages are not exempt from disclosure under FOIA in
either North Carolina22 or South Carolina.23 Nevertheless, the quality
of cost-benefit analyses is not regulated and varies greatly.
II. RECENT EDI ACTIVITY IN NORTH CAROLINA AND SOUTH CAROLINA
It is of interest to compare the bidding activity in open versus
closed states, particularly when they bid against each other for the same
company. North Carolina and South Carolina have bid against each
other with numerous EDI packages over the past decade. While North
Carolina’s policy requires that incentive offers for companies be made
publicly available, policymakers in South Carolina, including (former)
Gov. Mark Sanford and House Speaker Bobby Harrell, have advocated

19

N.C. GEN STAT. § 132-6(d) (2010).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(5)(c) (2010).
21
In a December 2010 survey grading states on how well they disclose
their EDIs online, Good Jobs First, a nonprofit nonpartisan research center in
Washington, DC, gave South Carolina a score of zero, the lowest possible
score. In comparison, North Carolina scored 69. Philip Mattera, et al., Show
Us
the
Subsidies,
GOOD
JOBS
FIRST
(Dec.
2010),
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/showusthesubsidies.
22
N.C. GEN STAT. § 132-1.11 (2010).
23
S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-55 (2010). It is worth noting, however, that this
section only requires disclosure either after the offered incentive is accepted or
when the project is publicly announced, whichever occurs later.
20
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to keep the bidding process sealed in an effort to attract major
employers by keeping their business plans private. 24
South Carolina alone has allocated roughly $2.5 billion in
incentive packages from fiscal year 1999 to 2008, resulting in 11%
annual growth in gross state product (GSP) compared to a national
average of almost 15% growth. 25 In response, at least in part, to this
lack of growth, some South Carolina legislators have called for
revisions to the current regulations on incentive offerings. Senator
Tom Davis drafted legislation—S. 206, The Economic Incentive
Transparency Act—which would radically transform the EDI process
in South Carolina. According to Senator Davis, “There’s really no
formal due diligence on these incentives to objectively analyze their
public costs and benefits . . . all we do is mouth the words ‘it creates
jobs’ and the analysis doesn’t really go beyond that.” 26
For the purpose of the analysis in this paper, North Carolina’s
EDI bidding process is considered more open than South Carolina’s.
Note that, in this context, this does not signify a policy of complete
transparency, but rather a policy that requires relatively more
information to be disclosed during the bidding process. Four cases, in
particular, highlight the nature of the controversy over whether
“openness” helps or hurts a state’s efforts to bring a target company
home. The level of economic wealth in these cases ranged from $50
million to upwards of $1 billion, demonstrating just how much
taxpayer funds are at stake and how essential is further analysis on the
effects of transparency within EDI bidding processes.
A. TOM DAVIS, S. 206, HIGHLIGHTS OF BILL
Senator Davis’ proposed bill calls for not only significant
changes in the nature and timeliness of disclosure of EDIs during the
24
Ben Szobody, Sweet Incentives Can Leave Sour Taste, N.C. INST. FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Aug. 1, 2010), http://www.ncicl.org/article/363 (last
visited June 28, 2011). S.C. House Speaker Bobby Harrell called North
Carolina's unilateral disclosure of incentive details "not real bright" and
postulated that such disclosures enable other states to make better offers.
25
Simon Wong & Jameson Taylor, A Review of Total State Spending, Part
II: An Effective Spending Cap for South Carolina, S.C. POL’Y COUNCIL (Dec.
20, 2010), http://www.scpolicycouncil.com/pdf/1215budgetpartii.pdf.
26
Eric K. Ward, Bill Proposes Transparency in Incentives, NERVE (Dec.
22, 2010), reprinted in BEFORE IT’S NEWS (Jan. 24, 2011, 08:44),
http://beforeitsnews.com/story/373/283/Bill_Proposes_Transparency_in_Incent
ives.html.
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bidding process, but also for radical changes in the way economic value
is assigned.27 Some of the highlights of the bill include new
requirements such as a cost-benefit analysis by an independent
economist for incentives that exceed $100,000 over a five-year period,
a clawback provision should the company not meet expectations, and a
cap on subsidies where the cost per job created exceeds the average per
capita income within the state (approximately $31,800 in 2009). 28 The
proposed bill requires public notice and a hearing for all incentive
packages valued at over $100,000.29 The bill also requires that a costbenefit analysis be communicated to the general public through the
Department of Commerce’s website, as well as to the general media
through email.30 The bill also describes in detail a process by which
information concerning the transaction could be made accessible to the
public without also revealing the target firm’s trade secrets and
personal data. The South Carolina Senate referred this bill to the
Committee on Finance in January 2011, where no further action has
been taken yet.31
B. ARGUMENTS FOR/AGAINST TRANSPARENCY
A major issue for all officials associated with the EDI bidding
process is whether taxpayer funds are being utilized in the most
appropriate manner. Historically, South Carolina officials have
advocated a more closed process, citing the advantages to potential
target firms. In North Carolina, a commentator has also recognized the
potential disadvantages of a transparent process:
State officials always have insisted that they have to
do economic development deals in secret, lest they
scare off would-be investors and hurt our chances
against other states. . . . Unlike South Carolina and
Alabama, North Carolina has a law that requires
incentive offers to be made public, in real time. 32

27

S. 206, 2011-2012 Leg., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2011)
Id. at §§ 12-66-120 to -130 (2011).
29
Id. at § 12-66-140 (2011).
30
Id.
31
S. JOURNAL, 2011-2012 Leg., 119th Sess. 1-206 (2011).
32
Op-Ed., Secrecy Drives Up Cost of Economic Development, N.C. INST.
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Aug. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Secrecy Drives Up
Cost], http://www.ncicl.org/article/369.
28
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North Carolina’s historic corporate income tax structure consists
of a flat 6.9% rate in comparison to South Carolina’s 5% rate. 33
However, the governor’s new budget will reduce North Carolina’s
corporate income tax rate to 4.9%, the lowest in the Southeast and third
lowest in the nation.34 This variable has influenced the bidding process
in terms of competitive interstate bids in order to entice companies to
receive the most beneficial packages possible. There is a possibility
that the change in the economic climate within North Carolina, with
such a significant adjustment to its income tax structure, will change
how the state chooses to offer EDIs.
A recent study of 338 deals in North Carolina involving business
incentives offered between 2001 and 2008 showed that the median
value of incentive packages was at least $200,000; yet the average
value of North Carolina incentive packages was $2 million, skewed by
a few outliers valued at over $10 million. 35 Schweke and Taylor
highlighted the effects of a handful of very large, local incentive
packages and warned that interstate bidding wars may destroy value
through over-paying in the terms of the deal.36 In three of the
following cases, it appears that North Carolina provided considerably
larger packages than other states involved in competitive bidding.
While there has been research in the academic literature
concerning the impact of EDIs, there is a lack of research regarding the
effects of a transparent bidding process on these deals. The following
four cases were selected based on size, publicity, and abundant
competition among states and localities for investment and jobs. Both
pundits and vocal state representatives have acknowledged that North
Carolina is relatively more transparent than South Carolina in their
disclosures on EDI.37 Both states have advocates and opponents for
their current strategies, and these four particular cases have served as
fodder for each line of reasoning.
Dell, Google, Caterpillar, and Boeing are major corporations that
33

State Corporate Income Tax Rates, 2000-2011, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 1,
2011), http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/230.html.
34
Matt Young, Governor Presents Surprise Tax Relief for North Carolina
Businesses,
CARY
CITIZEN,
Feb.
20,
2011,
http://carycitizen.com/2011/02/20/governor-presents-surprise-tax-relief-fornorth-carolina-businesses/.
35
WILLIAM SCHWEKE & BRIAN TAYLOR, CORP. FOR ENTER. DEV., LOCAL
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN NORTH CAROLINA (Dec. 16, 2008),
http://cfed.org/assets/pdfs/LocalIncentives_12-16-08[1].pdf.
36
Id.
37
Secrecy Drives Up Cost, supra note 32.
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have sought to relocate in the Southeast and, thus, have stirred up
competition for their investment. In all four cases, states and counties
with different disclosure policies offered major EDIs in order to
convince these companies to select their locations, and thus may offer
some insight into the interaction between EDI policy and the economic
outcomes. According to the 2011 rankings of Fortune 500 companies,
each corporation is ranked within the top one hundred firms within the
U.S.38 At the time of this publication, these four firms employ over
390,000 people and had revenue of $204.06 billion in the past twelve
months.39 Each of these deals was highly publicized, not only for the
implication of the job growth or the value of their EDI packages but
also because a major corporation with powerful name brand recognition
would now be part of the local economy. Google and Dell are
important case studies from the high-tech industry because each
company eventually accepted EDI packages in North Carolina, and
their bidding processes complement each other.
Additionally,
Caterpillar and Boeing offer rich examples from the manufacturing
sector of the need for research on the effects of transparency.
1. DELL
Dell was the recipient of a highly-publicized EDI for a computer
manufacturing plant in Winston-Salem in 2004.40 The deal was highly
sought after and involved tax breaks worth up to $277 million in
exchange for Dell’s promise to provide 1,500 jobs that paid $14 an
hour. This suggests that the state was willing to pay $185,000 per job
as part of the incentive package at a time when the per-capita income in

38

FORTUNE
500,
CNNMONEY
(May
23,
2011),
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2011/full_list/.
39
Google
Inc.
(GOOG):
Profile,
YAHOO!
FIN.,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=GOOG+Profile (follow “Key Statistics”
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011); Caterpillar Inc. (CAT): Profile, YAHOO!
FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=CAT+Profile (follow “Key Statistics”
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011); Boeing Co. (BA): Profile, YAHOO! FIN.,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=BA+Profile
(follow
“Key
Statistics”
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011); Dell Inc. (DELL): Profile, YAHOO! FIN.,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/pr?s=DELL+Profile (follow “Key Statistics”
hyperlink) (last visited June 28, 2011) (summing the “Full Time Employees”
and “Revenue” for the trailing twelve months as of April 29, 2011 for all four
companies).
40
See Jarrell, Shoesmith & Robbins, supra note 1.
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North Carolina was only $29,246.41 Instead, only four years after the
plant’s grand opening, 905 workers lost their jobs when Dell
announced its intentions to close the plant.42 The plant never fulfilled
its promise to employ 1,500 workers.43
North Carolina was engaged in a bidding war with the state of
Virginia for the Dell factory from the onset of the location selection
process. Virginia privately offered only $30-$37 million; nevertheless,
Forsyth County, North Carolina offered Dell an EDI package worth
$240 million and $37 million in state and local taxes, respectively. 44
N.C. Representative Paul Luebke expressed frustration when Virginia’s
bid was finally revealed and worried that “North Carolina was
bargaining against itself” in reference to the interstate bidding that went
on. Mike Randle, publisher of Southern Business & Development,
argued that “North Carolina had to overpay for Dell because it had
missed out on every ‘signature deal’ for the last 10 years.” 45 While
Dell was able to pay back the majority of the incentives, the $18
million in public money spent to help Dell prepare for the opening of
the plant in 2004 appears not to have been repaid.46
2. GOOGLE
In 2007, North Carolina offered a controversial EDI package to
bring the Google data center to Caldwell County. 47 The package was
valued at $212 million in tax cuts, infrastructure improvements, and

41
See David G. Lenze & Kathy Albetski, News Release: State Personal
Income, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALAYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE (Mar. 28,
2005), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/regional/spi/2005/spi0305.htm.
42
See Emery P. Dalesio, Millions Spent Luring Dell to NC Can’t Be
Recouped,
STREET
(Oct.
9,
2009),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10609805/millions-spent-luring-luring -dell-tonc-cant-be-recouped.html.
43
See id.
44
See Paul Chesser, Magazine: NC Overpaid for Dell, CAROLINA J.
ONLINE
(Jan.
14,
2005),
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=2107.
45
Paul Chesser, Did NC Overpay for Dell Plant?, CAROLINA J., Apr. 2005,
at
5,
available
at
http://www.johnlocke.org/acrobat/cjPrintEdition/carolina_journal.2005.04.pdf.
46
Dalesio, supra note 42.
47
See Cullen Browder, Google Incentives Fuel Debate About the Tactic,
WRAL.COM (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1197713.
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other incentives over thirty years in an effort to bring 210 jobs to a
community that had lost over 2,100 jobs in just three years. 48
Transparency was a major issue from the onset of the transaction.
Google conducted a bidding process by dispatching an employee to
gauge interest among different states and counties without informing
state officials which company he was representing. Rhett Weiss, one of
Google’s site negotiators, required that each county sign a strict
confidentiality agreement and did not inform participants in the highlycompetitive bidding of Google’s identity until months into the
process.49
The local Caldwell County portion of the $212 million Google
deal was estimated to be as high as $165 million.50 Part of the rationale
behind the Caldwell County deal was a desperate effort to outbid South
Carolina.
“Some news reports portrayed a direct, one-on-one
competition between North Carolina and South Carolina, which
implied one of the states would lose out. In reality, according to
Google officials, 12 locations in seven states [were] under
consideration . . . .”51 In return for “a 100 percent waiver on business
property taxes and an 80 percent waiver of real estate property taxes for
the next 30 years,” Google planned to bring 210 jobs paying
approximately $48,000 a year to Caldwell County at a cost of over $1
million per job.52 Many critics of the deal felt that Google executives
took advantage of Lenoir and Caldwell County officials through intense
secrecy throughout the bidding process.53

48
Nanette Byrnes & Coleman Cowan, The High Cost of Wooing Google,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK
(July
23,
2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_30/b4043066.htm.
49
Id.
50
Jonathan Q. Morgan, Using Economic Development Incentives: For
Better
or
Worse,
POPULAR
GOV’T,
Winter
2009,
at
16,
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/article3_13.pdf.
51
Paul Chesser, Did SC Get a Better Google Deal?, CAROLINA J. ONLINE
(Apr.
6,
2007),
http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=3993.
52
See John Dayberry, Based on Google Experience, Caldwell Officials
Say Apple Will Be Sweet Deal, HICKORY DAILY REC., July 12, 2009,
http://www2.hickoryrecord.com/news/2009/jul/12/based-google-experiencecaldwell-officials-say-app-ar-90040/.
53
Bob Orr, a former North Carolina Supreme Court justice who was
running for governor, spoke publicly against Google’s negotiation tactics. "It's
simply unconscionable from an ethics standpoint for this company to go in
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Debate continued when Google announced that it planned to
build an additional $600 million data center in Berkeley County, near
Charleston, S.C. Berkeley County appeared to get a much better deal
than Caldwell County; a Google spokesman said the company planned
to “pay $58.8 million over the 30 years ($1.96 million per year) in real
and personal property taxes through South Carolina's FILOT
program."54
It was recently announced that Caldwell County and the City of
Lenoir would receive $2 million in tax revenue because Google
delayed its request for tax rebates due to its failure to provide the
minimum number of jobs listed in its contract. 55 One Google official
stated that the company would not have considered relocating to North
Carolina or South Carolina without the lure of large incentive packages.
He said that without EDIs “the whole part of our economic analysis
doesn’t come out right [making relocation economically unfeasible].” 56
3. CATERPILLAR
Caterpillar recently announced that it elected to build a new
equipment plant in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The decision was
a result of aggressive bidding between Winston-Salem; Spartanburg,
South Carolina; and Montgomery, Alabama. After an intense bidding
process where South Carolina and Alabama were privy to North
Carolina’s public offers in advance of the official bid, Caterpillar
elected to accept the incentive offer of up to $40 million in WinstonSalem.57

from this very unfair bargaining position . . . . These are business decisions by
the smartest businesspeople in the world, and it's just exploiting a desperate
town." Byrnes and Cowan, supra note 48.
54
Chesser, supra note 51. South Carolina’s FILOT (fee-in-lieu of
property taxes) program enables counties to offer reduced property tax rates to
companies that promise significant capital investment and job creation. These
reductions can be substantial, 10.5% to 6% or even lower, which can translate
to massive long-term savings for a company.
55
See Paul Teague, Google Gives Up 2008 Incentives, NEWS-TOPIC
(Lenoir,
N.C.),
May
1,
2008,
http://www2.nccommerce.com/eclipsfiles/18921.pdf.
56
Chesser, supra note 51.
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As part of the transaction, Caterpillar was projected to employ
392 full-time and 118 contract workers in the new $426 million plant. 58
The facility is 850,000 square feet and is expected to pay an average
salary of $40,482 a year. 59 Considering the $40 million in incentives
($17 million to be provided by the state and the remaining $23 million
to be provided by Forsyth County), North Carolina effectively paid
roughly $78,431 per job. Bob Orr, a former N.C. Supreme Court
justice and the executive director of the N.C. Institute for Constitutional
Law, voiced his frustration on the matter: “If the whole process was on
eBay, we'd save the states millions of dollars.” 60 He further explained
that he felt as if North Carolina was being taken advantage of on a
continuing basis.61 “If you look at the budget holes state and local
governments are facing, it simply makes no sense to be giving this kind
of money away.”62
Orr is not the only state official who feels that way. Bobby
Harrell, the South Carolina House Speaker, expressed that North
Carolina’s decision to be transparent and reveal parts of their incentive
offerings provides other states with an unfair advantage. 63 South
Carolina and Alabama had the opportunity to analyze North Carolina’s
bid and assess their own offerings without reciprocating any
information.
The simple act of having multiple entities in a
competitive bidding process with different policies over transparency
creates a situation where states have the potential to overpay in order to
increase the likelihood that their bid is selected.
This process seems to destroy value for taxpayers by including
other states just for the sake of competition. The Mayor of
Montgomery, Alabama, Todd Strange, told The Montgomery
58
Richard Craver, Caterpillar Era Underway in Winston-Salem,
WINSTON-SALEM
J.,
Nov.
12,
2010,
http://www2.journalnow.com/business/2010/nov/12/caterpillar-era-under-waywinston-salem-ground-bro-ar-531889/.
59
Caterpillar Officially Announces Winston-Salem Project, NEWS &
RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), July 30, 2010, http://www.newsrecord.com/content/2010/07/30/article/reports_caterpillar_chooses_winston_sal
em.
60
Szobody, supra note 24.
61
David Bracken, Winston-Salem Lands Caterpillar, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER,
July
31,
2010,
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2010/07/31/1592590/winston-salem-landscaterpillar.html.
62
Id.
63
Szobody, supra note 24.
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Advertiser in the weeks leading up to the final decision that he did not
expect that Montgomery could match Winston-Salem’s offer.64 It is
unclear whether Montgomery or Spartanburg, South Carolina ever
intended to enter bids even near the $40 million package offered by
Winston-Salem, demonstrating the potential inefficiencies that arise
when transparency can act as an advantage or disadvantage. Orr
commented, “That is all part of the game—using the competition to
maximize an incentive offer.”65
4. BOEING
In late 2009, South Carolina announced that Boeing would be
constructing a 787 Dreamliner assembly line in North Charleston and
creating 3,800 jobs in the process.66 South Carolina officials and its
then-Governor, Mark Sanford, desperately sought to land the Boeing
project, as the state felt that it had missed an opportunity with the
company during a competitive bidding process in 2003. Many
reporters eagerly compared Boeing to other “crown jewel” companies
of the state, such as BMW, located in Greer, South Carolina. 67
The recent Boeing plant was yet another opportunity for North
Carolina and South Carolina to compete in the same bidding process.
Back in 2003, the two states bid against each other for the first
assembly line for the 787 airplane, but Boeing decided to build its plant
in Everett, Washington.68 While North Carolina never officially
released any information on the 2009 bid, it was widely rumored at the
time that South Carolina would be bidding against North Carolina.
This environment marked a stark contrast from previous bidding wars
64

Craver, supra note 58.
Szobody, supra note 24.
66
Mike Randle, Our Take on Boeing’s South Carolina Deal, S. BUS. &
DEV.,
http://www.sbd.com/Features/OurTakeonBoeingsSouthCarolinaDeal/tabid/308/Default.aspx
(last visited June 28, 2011).
67
Dominique Cantelme, South Carolina, Already Home to More than 100
Aerospace-related Companies, Lands a Crown Jewel: Boeing’s Second 787
Dreamliner
Plant,
BUS.
FACILITIES,
Jan.
1,
2010,
http://www.businessfacilities.com/articles/2009-economic-development-dealof-the-year-awards.php. Business Facilities Magazine gave South Carolina and
the Boeing project its 2009 Economic Deal of the Year Gold Award.
68
Alan M. Wolf, N.C. Officials Remain Quiet on Boeing as Washington
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NEWSOBSERVER.COM
(Oct.
14,
2009),
http://blogs.newsobserver.com/business/nc-officials-remain-quiet-on-boeingas-washington-wooing-intensifies.
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between these two states. Historically, South Carolina was privy to
EDI information that North Carolina disclosed prior to the company
choosing its final location. However, the high stakes of the Boeing
project reversed the roles of each state during the bidding process. The
rumor of competition with North Carolina may have drastically
impacted the monetary value of South Carolina’s bid in its effort to
ensure that the assembly line was built in North Charleston.
A significant amount of controversy has arisen over the Boeing
process, specifically there have been complaints regarding the lack of
disclosure of financial analysis in the months following the
announcement. The sheer size of the incentives made the offering one
of the largest EDI packages that the state had ever offered, at a value of
$450 million for the company to create 3,800 jobs and invest over $750
million in a seven-year period.69 The package was a result of a hardfought bidding war with Everett, Washington for the second time in
less than a decade, providing additional motivation for South Carolina
to make a successful bid.
After the initial announcement, many citizens and policymakers
within the state were excited at the prospect of having such a large
corporation within the aerospace industry that could provide the state
with several thousand jobs. Yet, within months of the opening
announcement, one local newspaper reported that the incentive package
may be worth as much as $900 million, twice what was originally
broadcasted when Boeing accepted the EDIs.70 The Post and Courier
performed its own cost-benefit analysis of the EDIs, which had been
valued at approximately $450 million. The newspaper determined that
the lower valuation did not factor in property and sales tax breaks that
Boeing would not have had to pay if it had not chosen North
Charleston as its location. By almost any measure, the EDIs alone will
be sufficient to fully reimburse Boeing for the company’s $750 million
investment required to build the plant in North Charleston. A costbenefit analysis, which was performed in preparing the package,
estimated that for every $1 spent in taxpayer funds, the state and
community of North Charleston would receive $14. 71 Many of the
officials involved with the deal attempted to deny claims that the $450

69
John McDermott & Yvonne Wenger, Boeing Lands in North
Charleston, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Oct. 28, 2009,
http://www.postandcourier.com/news/2009/oct/28/boeing-picks-charleston/.
70
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million figure was ever released and argued that the benefits of Boeing
far outweighed the costs of bringing the corporation into the state. 72
According to these figures, it appears that South Carolina was
willing to spend approximately $200,000 or more in taxpayer funds per
Boeing job. This large sum and the subsequent attempts by officials to
quell criticism over the deal was part of the motivation for Senator
Davis’s proposed S. 206 bill. The South Carolina Department of
Commerce believed that this EDI represented an investment that would
create the proposed 3,800 jobs at the Boeing factory, along with 5,971
jobs indirectly associated with the construction of the infrastructure and
suppliers, which could result in a $5.2 billion economic gain over a 15year period.73
With the lack of disclosure through FOIA concerning the true
value of the EDI package, it is difficult to ascertain whether the $900
million is an accurate value for the offering. Still, the discrepancies in
value, lack of prompt disclosure, and perceived secrecy all highlight
issues that may arise for taxpayers in states with closed policies.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF OPEN VERSUS SEALED BIDDING
There is a rich and growing literature on the impact of state and
local EDIs on various measures of economic wealth, including job
creation, salary levels, and tax revenues. The findings are mixed,
however, in large part because of the empirical and research design
challenges associated with isolating the impact of EDIs on a
community.74
While much of the existing literature concludes that EDIs destroy
economic wealth, a growing minority of more recent studies argue that
if used judiciously the EDI process can isolate the most beneficial
offers.75 Edmiston, for example, finds that because business follows
labor, the most effective EDIs may entice people, not firms, to
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Jarrell, Shoesmith & Robbins, supra note 1.
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Timothy J. Bartik, Solving the Problem of Economic Development
Incentives, 36 GROWTH & CHANGE 139 (2005); Michael Greenstone & Enrico
Moretti, Bidding for Industrial Plants: Does Winning a ‘Million Dollar Plant’
Increase Welfare? (NBER Working Paper No. 9844, 2003), available at
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~moretti/milliondollarplant.pdf (arguing that
EDIs create value).
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relocate.76 Greenbaum and Bondinio explore differences in the types of
funding mechanisms used in EDIs.77 They find that governments that
focus more on attracting businesses rather than job creation tend to use
loans rather than grants to fund EDIs, while those that face more
significant financing barriers, surprisingly, favor grants over loans,
even though grants typically are not repaid. Future research into the
impact of EDIs on wealth creation will need to control for the types of
financing mechanisms used.
Although the question of whether EDIs can create wealth rages
on, there seems to be no debate about the desirability of transparency in
the EDI bidding process. The near-universal opinion in both the
popular press and the academic literature is that an open bidding
process is preferable; state and local governments should disclose the
details of EDI bids to the public during the bidding process and hold
hearings to allow the public to discuss, debate, and presumably even
alter or veto the bid.78 An open and transparent bidding process is
distinguishable from the broader issue of accountability, where
recipient firms may make regular reports to the state on the status of
any performance pre-conditions of the EDI (for example, on number of
jobs created or retained) over the duration of the funding.
A columnist in the Knoxville News Sentinel recently lamented,
“Nobody, you see, is ever supposed to know anything about allocating
state money to corporations that are considering opening or expanding
an enterprise within Tennessee. Not until the deal is done. Well,
maybe unless you’re a sworn-to-secrecy insider, privileged to know
that which cannot be entrusted to common folk.” 79 Texas State
Controller Susan Combs identified a perceived flaw in the allocation of
Texas Enterprise and Emerging Technology funds following a wideranging review of the state’s job incentives programs. The review was
prompted after questions arose over links between contributors to
76

Kelly D. Edmiston, Attracting the Power Cohort to the Tenth District,
94 ECON. REV.: FED. RES. BANK OF KAN. CITY 69 (2009).
77
Robert Greenbaum & Daniele Bondonio, Incentivizing Economic
Development: An Empirical Examination of the Use of Grants and Loans, 7
S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. (forthcoming Oct. 2011).
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Bartik, supra note 75, at 140 (“Local decisions about incentives will be
improved by a more democratic process with full information . . . .”).
79
Tom Humphrey, Humphrey: Shhh! Bredesen’s $51 Million Secret,
KNOXVILLE
NEWS
SENTINEL,
May
16,
2010,
http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/may/16/shhh-bredesens-51-millionsecret/.
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Governor Perry’s campaign and companies that had been awarded jobcreation grants under the programs. “Due to the flexibility of the
decision-making process, the program appears less transparent at times,
causing a perception of outside influence [in the awarding of EDI
funds]” she wrote.80
The 2003 incentive package that brought the Scripps Research
Institute to Florida is facing some buyer’s remorse as well. “Nobody
asked what $569 million could do for Florida if such a mega-subsidy
was directed to other needy purposes . . . . Nobody asked because
nobody knew. To some who think government should be more
publicly accountable with taxpayer dollars used to lure new business,
the secrecy of the Scripps deal barely passes the sniff test.” 81
Most proponents of increased disclosure base their arguments on
philosophical grounds of equity and fairness. They contend that
because the state is spending the public’s money, the public has a right
to know how its money is being spent. Sealed bids, those known only
to the involved parties, encourage secrecy and corruption, neither of
which has a place in the EDI bidding process. Under this view, state
and local government officials have an obligation to fully disclose the
details of the proposed EDI bid to the public, and to hold hearings to
allow for public commentary and debate about the nature of the bid. 82
A. THE ECONOMIC ARGUMENT FOR DISCLOSURE
This paper argues that if the goal of EDIs is to create economic
wealth, then the issue of whether the bidding process should be open or
closed should be determined, or at least informed, by its impact on

80
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23,
2010,
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TIMES,
June
13,
2005,
http://www.sptimes.com/2005/06/13/Columns/Who_really_benefits_f.shtml.
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See Bartik, supra note 75; see also Peter D. Enrich, Business Tax
Incentives: A Status Report, 34 URB. LAW. 415 (2002); John Howe and Ingrid
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wealth creation.83 Timothy J. Bartik, senior economist at the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research and widely regarded expert
on EDIs, calls for greater transparency of incentives and incentive
offers, yet he does not provide thorough economic analysis to support
this demand. Bartik’s reasons for greater transparency include the
following: (1) disclosure will improve the bargaining position of
economic developers; (2) it will promote broader public debate; (3) it
will allow better research on incentives; and (4) it is essential for any
incentive regulation by the federal government or supranational
organization.84
An example may help illustrate the implications of Bartik’s
reasoning. Assume that if Company X relocates in South Carolina,
$100 of additional economic wealth is created for society, where
society consists of consumers, businesses, and government. Further,
assume that all parties concur with this figure.85 If South Carolina
offered Company X an EDI package of $100 in tax rebates and other
measures, and Company X accepted the offer, the net economic impact
of the relocation to society would be $0 (ignoring the waste and loss of
value associated with the mechanisms for collecting and distributing
the tax revenues). If South Carolina reduced its offer to $80 and
Company X accepted, South Carolina and its citizens would be better
off by $20. Lastly, if South Carolina paid $120 to entice Company X,
$20 of social economic wealth would be destroyed.
This example enables a closer examination of Bartik’s first
reason for transparency. Bartik theorizes that “disclosure may . . . give
economic developers a more accurate knowledge of what alternatives
are open to business locations decision makers, which should improve
the bargaining position of economic developers. Businesses already
know what they have been offered by different local areas, but

83

The authors are not aware of any academic study on the impact of
transparency of EDI bids on economic wealth. The studies which approach the
issue of transparency in EDI bidding either ignore the issue of openness or
simply conclude, without analysis and apparently on some unspoken
philosophical grounds, that the bidding process in EDIs should be more
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News that while transparency has the potential to drive up the price of EDI
bids, secrecy makes it a sure thing. See Secrecy Drives Up Cost, supra note 32.
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economic developers do not.”86 Bartik is suggesting one of two things:
either that the value of Company X to South Carolina is a function of
its value to other states and that South Carolina needs to know those
bids in order to assign value to the relocation, or that South Carolina
knows the value of this company’s relocation but wants to pay as little
as possible in a winning EDI bid.
The first interpretation is not plausible for two reasons. First, the
value of a company to a state depends on the specific economic
conditions in that state, not on the company’s performance in some
other state. Second, if every state needed to see what another state was
offering in order to assess value, no state would be able to unilaterally
assign value to the deal. Specifically, if Bartik is assuming that
officials need information on competing offers in order to determine
value, he must explain how competing offers from other states are
economically valid in the first place while offers from the state in
question are not. Finally, under this interpretation of Bartik’s first
reason for transparency, the competing states’ offers must be
interpreted as accurate disclosures of the value of the company to those
states. There is an important distinction between the actual economic
value of the relocation to a state, and the (winning) EDI bid by that
state. It is the difference between the two that determines the value of
EDIs to society.
The second, more valid interpretation of Bartik’s first reason is
that knowledge of other offers helps the state fashion a bid that is high
enough to win, but not so high as to “overpay” for the EDI, where
overpayment is determined by the relationship between the actual value
of the relocation to the state and this state’s bid. The impact of
transparency on the bidding process, however, remains an open
question under Bartik’s formulation.
Bartik’s second reason for calling for national transparency in the
EDI bidding process is that it will promote broader public debate. As
economic value is clearly not determined by democratic vote, Bartik
must be referring to public debate about the veracity of the state’s bid.
The mechanism by which public debate may “improve” the EDI bid is
unclear. Unless public debate generates higher quality information
about the relocation or supplants state officials’ deliberation with a
superior analysis of the data, the call for public debate on the EDI
bidding process holds little promise for improving the economic impact
of EDIs. If Bartik is referring to the disciplinary impact of public
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debate against overpaying, then the relationship between transparency
and the bidding process remains unresolved.
Bartik’s third justification for transparency in EDIs is that it
“allows better research on incentives.” This seems more directed
toward improving the impact of the incentives on economic well-being
and wealth than on deliberately increasing transparency of the bidding
process.87 Bartik implicitly assumes that incentives can in fact be
improved, which remains an open and fairly complex empirical
question, and that independent researchers are in a better position than
the state to assess the impact of the EDIs on wealth.
The last of the four reasons Bartik offers in support of EDI
transparency is that “it is essential for any incentive regulation by the
federal government or supranational organization.” It appears that, in
this instance, Bartik is referring to the transparency of the details of the
state or local EDI programs to the federal organization, which simply
requires direct reporting by the state to the federal body, not public
hearings and debate. While it is likely that the states will not
voluntarily agree to a uniform EDI policy, this begs the question of
whether local EDIs will be found to be unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause.88 If unconstitutional, the issue of whether public
disclosure at the time of the bid adds value becomes moot. However,
in the foreseeable future, the use of local and state EDIs is very likely
to remain widespread.
Although Bartik’s reasons may seem compelling and intuitive, he
does not provide an economic analysis to support his demand for
transparency. Since the goal of EDIs is to create economic wealth, then
only if open bids support wealth creation should the EDI bidding
process be open. The economics literature may provide insight into the
potential impact on the level and distribution of wealth creation of
sealed versus open EDI bidding processes. Two lines of research in the
87

See Enrich, supra note 82. Enrich points out that better data on costs
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See Jarrell, Shoesmith & Robbins, supra note 1; Enrich, supra note 82.
Enrich observes that most of the tax breaks offered to influence business
location decisions appear to violate well-established Commerce Clause norms,
and litigation challenging their constitutionality may offer the best hope of
reversing the continuing proliferation of tax incentives.

248

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 7.2

economics literature are relevant: economics of search and auctions.
B. ECONOMICS OF SEARCH
In the seminal work in this field, George J. Stigler, winner of the
1982 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, explains that searching for the
best price on a product or service creates economic wealth. 89 A
“search” is the process by which “[a] buyer (or seller) who wishes to
ascertain the most favorable price . . . canvass[es] various sellers (or
buyers) . . . .”90 If there was perfect information where buyers and
sellers have full knowledge of each other and of the products or
services being bought and sold, or if all products or services were
identical, then search creates zero additional value. However, if there
is imperfect information about the parties, product, or service, or if the
product or service varies either in its features, quality, or terms of sale,
then search creates benefits.91 The benefits of search are the added
value or revenues from a better match between supplier and consumer.
The benefit can be as simple as finding the same good at a lower price.
The larger the price dispersion, the greater the potential benefits of
search,92 since with search one is likely to find a lower price. Price
dispersion, however, is a biased measure of ignorance (or “asymmetric
information”) in the market.
Price dispersion is also due to
heterogeneity of the buyers or sellers in the market.93
Nonetheless, search costs money. The costs of search are
essentially the time, man-hours, and the possibility that by continuing
to search and delaying purchase, the better deal will slip away. The
optimal amount of search is given by the point where the additional
benefits of search equal its additional costs. 94
89
George S. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL ECON. 213
(1961).
90
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Research applying the economics of search to the labor market was
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2010: MARKETS WITH SEARCH COSTS, ROYAL SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
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survey of the literature applying search costs to the labor market, see Richard
Rogerson, Robert Shimer & Randall Wright, Search-Theoretic Models of the
Labor Market: A Survey, 43 J. ECON. LIT. 959 (2005).
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The costs and benefits of search may be illustrated with an
example from the labor market.95 An unemployed person benefits from
searching for the best job, one that best matches their skills and
preferences to employers’ needs. A good match results in an efficient,
sustainable outcome, which creates the maximum value for society.
The optimal search is the one that equates the additional benefits of
search (finding a job for which the person is best suited, in a
geographic region they prefer, that gives them the opportunity to
advance, and other factors) to the additional costs of continuing to
search (explicit costs of the job search such as gas, printing resumes,
and conducting on-line searches, as well as the implicit costs of search
such as foregone income and the psychological costs of being
unemployed). If the costs of search were so high that a person took the
first job offer, there is a higher probability that the person would be a
poor match for that job and would leave that job for a different one
sooner. Social welfare would decline as a result of this poor match.
The same holds for other types of economic transactions. In the
case of EDIs, the buyer can be modeled as the firm and the sellers as
the various states and counties trying to entice the firm to either
relocate to or expand in their region. Each state is “selling” a bundled
good which consists of a particular labor force, infrastructure, capital
base, climate, tax policy, and EDI offer.
These goods vary
considerably across states and through time. The more varied the
goods, the higher the potential gain to the firm from search for the best
“price,” or lowest cost.96
The state with the most attractive package—the one that
maximizes the revenues and minimizes the costs to the firm—will win
the deal. Part of the price the buyer pays to obtain the best deal is
search cost. The state has every incentive to minimize this cost to the
firm by quickly and clearly identifying itself as a potential supplier of
the good, and communicating the details of the EDI offer to the firm.
Disclosing the bid to the public, however, would improve neither the
95
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quantity nor the quality97 of the information exchanged between the
state and the firm. On the contrary, it may raise the cost to the
company of relocating to or expanding in that state. Companies often
require that their relocation or expansion plans be kept confidential to
protect trade secrets and confidential taxpayer information, and to
avoid excessive real estate speculation that might drive up the costs of
land acquisition.98 The financial economics literature has generated
some evidence that may predict the impact of regulations requiring
hearings and similar public disclosure of trade secrets and other
innovative business plans.
For example, in 1968, the William’s Act was amended to require
a 20-day waiting period in tender offers and disclosure of specific
information about how the company planned to create value.99 These
amendments are analogous to requiring public hearings and open
bidding in EDIs. As a result of the Williams Act, bidder competition
and the level of bids significantly increased which reduced the returns
to the winning bidder and their incentive to invest in tender offers. As
expected, the overall amount of economic wealth generated by tender
offers fell, and more of that wealth was captured by the target.
The implications of the impact of the Williams Amendment for
EDI policy are clear. Opening the bidding process and requiring more
transparency about the details of EDI bids will likely result in increased
interstate and intrastate competition for the target firm. When there are
more potential locations in play and public hearings delay agreements
and the implementation of innovative business plans, a company may
be able to elicit larger EDI bids from hopeful candidates eager to outbid
one another and “win” business. This chain reaction may ultimately
transfer more wealth (in the form of EDIs) from the chosen state to the
target firm, thus reducing the social benefits of the incentives program.

97

See ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND
TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE VALUE OF ANY ASSET, 577 (Wiley ed., 2d
ed. 2002).
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C. THE AUCTION LITERATURE
An auction is a public sale where goods or services are sold to
the highest bidder. In economic theory, an auction refers to any set of
trading rules for exchange. The basic components of an auction model
consist of a set of potential buyers (states, in the case of EDIs), the joint
distribution of valuations for these potential buyers (how much value
could be created by the firm in each of these states), and a reserve price
rule (the minimum EDI package) used by the seller. 100
In the context of EDIs, an auction takes place when two or more
states bid to attract a company to its jurisdiction using tax abatements
or similar incentives as payment. 101 If bidders are risk-neutral,
homogeneous, have the same information set, and bid competitively
(rather than engage in collusion, for example), then both open and
sealed bidding processes yield the same revenue to the firm, the same
bidder participation, and the same winner. This is the “revenue
equivalence theorem.”102 In practice, however, these assumptions fail
to hold, and the impact of requiring openness in the EDI bidding
process depends on the degree to which these assumptions fail.103 For
example, some research finds that open bidding, by enabling bidders to
inspect one another’s valuations,104 encourages collusion between
bidders to reduce offer prices. Other studies find that when bidders or
states are asymmetric (have different costs of implementing EDI
packages, for example), the expected revenue generated to the firm and
the expected value of the EDI program to the state may be higher or
lower under open bidding versus closed bidding, depending on the
nature of the asymmetry.105 Others find that the nature of the relevant
information, whether common or private, determines whether open or
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closed bidding dominates.106 However, no distinct patterns emerge. In
addition, much of this literature presumes a profit motive on the part of
the participants, which is questionable in the case of state-administered
EDI programs.
Some evidence in the auction and game theory literature suggests
that open bidding increases the incidence of both the “winner’s curse”
and “adverse selection.” By sharing information about the nature and
specifics of the EDI bid with the public and thus with other potential
bidders, open bidding may result in less wealth creation by the winning
state.107
D. WINNER’S CURSE AND ADVERSE SELECTION
The winner's curse occurs in common-value auctions with
incomplete information. In a common-value auction, the information
about the auctioned item is spread among the bidders; hence, a bidder
would modify the value of winning if the once-private information of
opponents was made available through, for example, an open bidding
process. In a private-value auction, a bidder’s estimate of the value of
winning is independent of the value placed on winning by others.
The winner of an auction is, of course, the bidder who submits
the highest bid. Since the auctioned item is worth roughly the same to
all bidders in a common-value auction, they are distinguished only by
their respective estimates. The winner, then, is the bidder making the
106
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highest estimate. If we assume that the average bid is accurate, then the
highest bidder overestimates the item's value. Thus, the auction's
winner is likely to overpay.
Bidders may try to avoid the winner's curse by bid shading, or
placing a bid that is below their estimation of the value of the item for
sale. This increases the likelihood that they may lose out to a
competing bidder; consequently, this may be a negative outcome if the
bidder lacks alternative options. The bidder has expended resources to
woo investment, but has nothing to show for it.
The severity of the winner's curse increases with the number of
bidders.108 This is because the more bidders there are, the more likely
it is that some of them have overestimated the firm’s value to the state.
To the extent that open bidding encourages more competition and/or
higher bids, the winner’s curse problem is intensified. “Winning the
auction is bad news to the extent that it reveals the winning bidder’s
signal was more optimistic than that of the other bidders, and the
greater the level of competition the worse the news associated with
winning.”109 Looking at EDIs, a winning bid amid robust competition
may suggest that the winner has overpaid, thus destroying social
wealth. The winner’s curse problem is also more severe in cases where
the estimator has limited liability for valuation mistakes, as is the case
with EDIs, as government officials are not held personally liable for
overpayment.110 Ironically, some argue that open bidding and similar
accountability provisions may actually protect state officials from
accusations of misevaluation.111
For auctions with private values, when the value of the firm to
the state is independent of its value to other states, the winner's curse is
less likely to arise. Any bidding mechanism that encourages states to
108
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perform a careful cost-benefit analysis of the value of attracting or
retaining a specific firm to that state, regardless of the value other states
may assign to that transaction, results in fair valuations and efficient
outcomes. Sealed bids reduce the incidence of the winner’s curse and
its associated costs by circumventing the incentive to outbid actual or
potential competitors.
E. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: OPTIMAL BIDDING PROCESS
Auctions are of specific interest to economists because they are
explicit mechanisms, which demonstrate the way that prices are formed
and values are assigned.112 There is much theoretical work on auctions
that has been done; however, empirical work is much more limited, as
are the conclusions on optimal bidding processes and design of
markets.113
Recent empirical research into the optimal auction process has
had two main goals.114 One is to test the behavioral theories about how
potential buyers actually bid. If the valuations of the buyers and the
probability law governing these valuations are known to the researcher,
then this question is easily addressed by comparing the submitted bids
with those predicted by the optimal open or closed bidding strategy. 115
Experimental or laboratory studies suffer from the problem that the
behavior of subjects in the lab may differ from agents in the real world.
Thus, while informative and cost-effective, experimental studies are no
substitute for careful field work. Field data, on the other hand, are
drawn from diverse buyers with unknown valuations and little choice in
the types of bidding mechanisms they use.116
The second goal of empirical research on auctions is to identify
the probability distributions governing the valuations of potential
buyers so that their observed bids from a cross-section of auctions can
be used to infer whether open or closed bidding was optimal. Auction
theory states that if the revenue generation is the same between open
and closed bidding processes, participants will be indifferent between
112
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regimes and will randomly switch between bidding mechanisms. 117
Yet, there are almost no instances of this type of switching in private
industry. The problem may be, however, that there are very few
markets in which buyers can choose which bidding format they will
use. Only two relatively robust markets allow buyers to influence
bidding format, and both involve public transactions. One is the
auction of U.S. treasury bills, and the other is timber auctions by the
U.S. Forest Service.118
The U.S. Forest Service timber program provides a useful test
case as it uses both open and sealed bidding, at times even randomizing
the choice. This market also involves heterogeneous bidders, with
sophisticated mills bidding directly against small loggers for tracts of
land and timber.
Susan Athey and Jonathan Levin, professors of economics at
Harvard & Stanford respectively, have found that with heterogeneous
bidders, sealed bidding promotes entry by weak bidders, which, in their
study of timber auctions, were small logging firms that lacked
manufacturing capacity.119 In a sealed-bid auction, the bidders with the
highest value—in this case, larger mills with manufacturing
capability—have an incentive to shade their bids a bit below their true
valuations in order to increase profits; therefore, weaker bidders can
win despite not having the highest valuation. This window of
opportunity gives weaker bidders an incentive to enter sealed-bid
auctions and may be akin to the adverse selection issue discussed
earlier. These results must be applied to EDIs with caution, however,
because the bidders studied by Athey and Levin are firms with profit
motives. Other research on unobserved auction heterogeneity—when a
researcher does not have access to all common information, such as the
bidders’ cost structures—adds texture to Athey & Levin’s findings. 120
These studies show that differences in bidders have a significant effect
on the auction outcome, including profits and efficiency. Bidder costs
and the reservation price set by the seller are higher than previously
estimated using one-dimensional models of bidder private
117
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information.121 Small differences in modeling or inferences create
significant differences in empirical results. Empirical research on the
impact of open versus closed bidding mechanisms is in its infancy, and
the results are unclear.122
IV. CONCLUSION
Philosophically, it is easy to support an open EDI bidding
process because taxpayers expect their public officials to be
accountable for decision-making concerning government spending and
subsidies. But because the goal of EDIs is to maximize economic
wealth—whether measured in terms of the number or quality of jobs
created, land value, or tax revenues—one must look to the economic
consequences of open versus closed bidding before concluding that
open bidding mechanisms are better.
The economics literature suggests that with diverse bidders and
imperfect information, the EDI prices paid by states with open bidding
are significantly higher than those with sealed bids. As a result, less
wealth is created for states with open bidding, and more of that wealth
is retained by the target firms, exemplifying the winner’s curse as in the
Dell example.
The economic costs and benefits of disclosure are especially
complex with EDIs because such activities have one foot in private
industry and the other in the public domain. They involve supramarket transactions and negotiations where the usual economic
incentives to minimize costs and maximize value may be superseded by
political motives, such as serving the public good and retaining political
office. It may very well be that if all states were open, overbidding
would not occur, and efficient outcomes would prevail. Such a result,
however, would require federal intervention, likely through the
Commerce
Clause
of
the
United
States
Constitution.
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